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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2008, the Québec Court of Appeal in Hocking c.
Haziza1 refused to recognize and enforce an Ontario Court
judgment because it disagreed with how the Ontario judge decided
the case, and found the judgment to be incompatible with
fundamental principles of Québec law.2 By this ruling, the Court
implicitly sought to change not just class action culture, but legal
1. Hocking c. Haziza, (2008), QCCA 800 (CanLII). This class action arose
from a motion for certification filed by Robert Hocking against HSBC Bank on
behalf of all Canadian customers of HSBC who had made an early pay-out of
their mortgage and consequently incurred a penalty. David Haziza, a Québec
resident, filed a similar motion in Québec, limiting the class to Québec residents
only. The Ontario Court approved the class action for settlement purposes a few
months later. Accordingly, the Ontario decision at stake was an order certifying
a multi-jurisdictional class action for settlement purposes. The Québec Superior
Court concluded that the Ontario Court had no jurisdiction over class members
residing in Québec. In her reasons upholding the Superior Court decision, the
Court of Appeal stated that the Ontario Court had no right to get involved in
defining the rights and liabilities of residents of another province, and that the
territorial limits on the scope of provincial legislative authority prevented the
application of the law of a province to matters that were not sufficiently
connected to it. The Court of Appeal held that the Ontario judgment failed to
meet the requirements of the CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC for recognition and
enforcement of personal actions of a patrimonial nature. Interestingly, it
concluded that the Ontario judgment was rendered in violation of the essential
principles that govern civil proceedings in Québec since the interests of the nonresident class members were not taken into consideration by the Court, and the
adequate notice requirements regarding the proposed settlement were not met.
2. Id. at ¶. 223 et seq. (“. . . je suis également d'avis que le jugement
ontarien, en l'espèce, a été rendu en violation des principes essentiels de la
procédure, au sens de l'article 3155, paragr. 3, C.C.Q., en ce que la juge saisie du
recours collectif et, au même moment, de la ratification d'un règlement amiable,
n'a pas examiné la question de savoir ce qu'il en était des intérêts des nonrésidents (dont les Québécois) visés par le recours, de la protection de leurs
intérêts et de sa propre compétence sur ces justiciables.”).
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norms applicable in that area of law. Indeed, it recognized the
importance of protecting class action members’ rights by notifying
them appropriately about proposed settlements through extensive
notice requirements.3 Accordingly, Hocking illustrates how one
Canadian province’s legal culture influences class action law
developments and how class actions and their applicable law can,
reciprocally, influence and affect culture.
In this paper, I will first review the different theories of law
and culture, and define the concept and breadth of legal culture.
Second, I will discuss the relationship between law and culture,
referring to the existing literature on the subject. I will also discuss
how authors have connected culture to civil procedure, and why
the concept of “modern legal culture” is important in the context of
class action law. Third, I will address the main thesis of my paper:
the cultural construction of class action law. I will argue that the
class action encourages the transmission of culture, and discuss
how the history of the North American class action was influenced
by culture. I will thereafter argue that the class action mirrors
society’s structure and culture, in light of the following three
characteristics of North American contemporary culture: access to
justice, managerial judging and the preference for settlements.
Fourth, I will argue that class actions affect North American legal
culture, as evidenced by changes in the legal institutions, in the
role of judges and in the legal profession. Last, I will argue that
the cross-constitutive relationship between class action law and
culture must be studied both theoretically and empirically.
Ultimately, I will demonstrate that the class action is a
disputing institution that is culturally constructed, that plays a role
in the construction and transmission of culture–that is, of social
arrangements, systems of beliefs and values. This project is
ambitious, but distinctive as no author has to my knowledge
related class action law to culture in such a way.4
3. Id. at ¶228 et seq.
4. But see, Steven Penney, Mass Torts, Mass Culture: Canadian Mass Tort
Law and Hollywood Narrative Film, 30 QUEEN’S L.J. 205 (2004) (where the
author argues that Canadian mass tort law may be influenced by American
popular culture, and in particular by Hollywood films) and Carole Younes, Le
recours collectif québécois: les réalités collectives à travers le prisme du droit,
15 R.C.D.S. 111,130 (2000). Many authors, however, have examined the
relationship between civil procedure law and culture. See, notably, Daniel Jutras,
Culture et droit processuel: Le cas du Québec (2008) (unpublished, on file with

104

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 2

II. THE THEORIES OF CULTURE
A. Cultivating Law
Culture is important to our understanding of legal systems. But
what exactly do we mean by “culture?” It is a vague, “amorphous
and diffuse”5 concept that can include both a local culture–such as
the Québecois culture, for instance–and a more global one–such as
the North American culture.
Moreover, it occasionally is
compared to or confused with the concepts of tradition6 and
civilization.7
In fact, the word “culture” originates from the Latin cultura,
The
stemming from colere, which means “to cultivate.”8
dictionary defines culture as “[t]he distinctive ideas, customs,
social behaviour, products, or way of life of a particular society,

author); ANTOINE GARAPON & IOANNIS PAPADOPOULOS, JUGER EN AMÉRIQUE
ET EN FRANCE (Éditions Odile Jacob 2003); ANTOINE GARAPON, BIEN JUGER–
ESSAI SUR LE RITUAL JUDICIAIRE (Éditions Odile Jacob 2001); Mauro
Cappelletti, Social and Political Aspects of Civil Procedure–Reforms and
Trends in Western and Eastern Europe, 69 MICH. L. REV. 847 (1971). Finally,
Professor Francisco Valdes of the University of Miami School of Law has
recently written about class actions and social justice in his article entitled,
Procedure, Policy and Power: Class Actions and Social Justice in Historical
and Comparative Perspective, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 627 (2008) (where
Professor Valdes concludes that “consideration of bedrock social and legal
values . . . can help point the way toward a systemic, principled solution to basic
questions of power, policy, and procedure associated with class action
controversies.”) Valdes’ focus, however, is different from mine, as he
principally seeks to explore why the class action has moved from a “venerable
fixture of procedure” to a device increasingly under attack.
5. Rodney MacDonald, Civil Justice Reform Working Group, Discussion
Paper presented at the Civil Justice Reform Working Group, February 23, 2005,
BRITISH
COLUMBIA
JUSTICE
REVIEW,
available
at
http://www.bcjusticereview.org/working_groups/civil_justice/cjrwg_paper_02_
23_05.pdf (last visited September 26, 2009).
6. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 3 et seq. (3d ed.
2007). Glenn defines tradition as principally including the transmission of
information.
7. Loïc Cadiet, Droit et culture, Journées Louisianaises, Association Henri
Capitant 2008, at 3.
8. DOUGLAS HARPER, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, 2001 (“Culture”),
available at http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=culture (last visited
August 21, 2009).
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people, or period.”9 The UNESCO refers to culture “as the set of
distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of
society or a social group, and . . . to art and literature, lifestyles,
ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”10
When we think of legal culture, we generally refer not so much
to rituals, systems of belief and habit, language and religion, but to
norms of behaviour such as law and morality. Accordingly, law is
no doubt part of a given society’s culture. And, as will be argued
in this paper, this given society’s culture explains, creates, and is
influenced by its legal system.
Legal academics have acknowledged that the definition of legal
culture is flexible, and may vary depending on the purpose of the
one defining it.11 Lawrence Friedman, for instance, has defined
legal culture as the:
. . . [I]deas, values, attitudes, and opinions people in some
society hold, with regard to law and the legal system.
Every person has a ‘legal culture,’ just as every person has
a general culture, and a social culture; every person has
individual, unique traits, as distinctive as his or her
fingerprints; but each person is at the same time part of a
collective, a group, a social entity, and shares in the ideas
and habits of that group.
Legal culture is the source of law–its norms create the legal
norms; and it is what determines the impact of legal norms
on society. After all the ‘subjects’ of law, the people it
affects, are not robots or inert lumps of clay; they are living
human beings, with thoughts, ideas, minds, habits,
9. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2008, s.v. “culture.” Also see the
COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 2008, s.v. “culture:” “the total
of the inherited ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, which constitute the
shared bases of social action,” or “the total range of activities and ideas of a
group of people with shared traditions, which are transmitted and reinforced by
members of the group.”
10. PREAMBLE TO THE UNESCO UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON
DIVERSITY
(2001),
available
at
CULTURAL
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf
(last visited
September 26, 2009).
11. OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE AND RITUAL 7 (2005) (noting that the
definition of culture depends on its purposes); David Nelken,
Disclosing/Invoking Legal Culture: An Introduction, 4 SOC. & LEGAL STUD.
435, 438 (1995).
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behaviours; they react to orders and institutions of laws,
and their reactions determine the effect of these orders and
institutions. . . .
Legal culture is a broad term for attitudes and opinions; the
phenomenon shows up in the literature sometimes as ‘legal
consciousness’ . . ., or as knowledge and opinion about law
. . . We can measure [legal culture] directly, by asking
people questions; or indirectly, by watching what people do
and inferring their attitudes from what we see. . . .12
[emphasis added]
Oscar Chase similarly defines culture as including: “the
‘traditional ideas, values and norms’ that are widely shared in a
social group,” as well as “propositions of belief that are both
normative (‘killing is wrong except when authorized by the state’)
and cognitive (‘the earth is round’).”13 On whether culture should
include the institutions and social arrangements that are specific to
a community, Chase argues that “[d]isputing institutions are at
once a product of, a contributor to, and an aspect of culture.”14
Hence, for Chase, dispute resolution institutions both result from
culture and influence or affect culture.
Generally, academics have noted the difficulty of defining the
concept of legal culture, as well as its specific scope and the
relationship between each of its relevant elements.15 Roger
Cotterrell, notably, has stated that, “[t]he imprecision of the
[various formulations of legal culture] makes it hard to see what

12. Lawrence M. Friedman, Is There a Modern Legal Culture?, 7:2 RATIO
JURIS 117, 118-119 (1994).
13. CHASE, supra note 11, at 6, who quotes MELFORD E. SPIRO, CULTURE
AND HUMAN NATURE viii, 32 (1994). See also Oscar G. Chase, Legal
Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 9 (1997) (“.
. . the culture of a community of people includes those beliefs about how to
properly relate to each other that are deeply held, widely shared, and persistent
over time.”).
14. CHASE, supra note 11, at 7.
15. ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW, CULTURE AND SOCIETY–LEGAL IDEAS IN
THE MIRROR OF SOCIAL THEORY 83 (Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2006). See also
GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 4, at 17 et seq.; and generally:
DICTIONNAIRE DE LA CULTURE JURIDIQUE (Denis Alland & Stéphanie Rials eds.,
2003).
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exactly the concept covers and what the relationship is between the
various elements said to be included within its scope.”16
B. The Breadth of Legal Culture
Accordingly, one major obstacle to working with the concept
of legal culture is agreeing on exactly what it encompasses, and on
where its limits should be drawn. What is the most relevant social
unit to legal culture? Exactly which legal culture should be
focused upon? Indeed, as Friedman remarked, “one can speak of
legal culture at many levels of abstraction.”17
North American legal culture includes the legal norms
generated by the two major prevalent systems of justice–the civil
law, applicable in the province of Québec and in the State of
Louisiana and U.S. territory of Puerto Rico, and the common law,
applicable in the rest of Canada and in the rest of the U.S. It also
includes elements of the inquisitorial and adversarial systems,
specific to the civil and common law traditions.18 Moreover, it
incorporates countless ideas, values and norms derived from
provincial, state, territorial, and local (city) or regional legal
activity.
Is ascertaining national culture and distinguishing it from the
more global or international culture necessary and relevant to the
study of law?19 And if it is, what exactly must be included in
national or local culture? For instance, how specific to Québécois
culture is a particular cultural trait that also exists at the North
16. COTTERREL, supra note 15, at 83.
17. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE
PERSPECTIVE 204 (1975); cf. Friedman, supra note 12, at 120.
18. Since Québec has adopted most aspects of the adversarial system
regarding its civil litigation procedures and its class action procedure, this latter
issue is less critical to my study, however. See, e.g., W.A. Bogart et al., Class
Actions in Canada: A National Procedure in a Multi-Jurisdictional Society?
(2007), Report prepared for The Globalization of Class Actions Conference,
Oxford
University,
December
2007,
at
1,
available
at:
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Canada_Na
tional_Report.pdf (last visited September 26, 2009). See also, Jutras, supra
note 4, at 3, citing JEAN-MAURICE BRISSON, LA FORMATION D’UN DROIT MIXTE :
L’ÉVOLUTION DE LA PROCÉDURE CIVILE DE 1774 À 1867 (Thémis 1986).
19. See, e.g., John D. Jackson, Playing the Culture Card in Resisting CrossJurisdictional Transplants: A Comment on “Legal Processes and National
Culture”, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 51, 52-53 (1997).
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American level? While each nation has a legal culture,20 there
exists both “a convergence and divergence of cultures” which
“[pulls] against the concept of national culture.”21 In Canada, for
example, there is both a convergence of provincial cultures,
evidenced by the legislative uniformity in some areas of the law,22
and a divergence of cultures, evidenced by the specificity of
certain provincial legal systems.23 This duality makes Canadian
legal culture hard to define. Another difficulty with the concept of
national legal culture is the fact that there is a plurality of legal
cultures, as complex as the society it is associated with.24
Setting aside these difficulties, I will, in this paper, refer to
culture as including the ideas, values and norms conveyed by the
American and Canadian societies and their state institutions. I will
argue that their culture influences the development of the class
action (as a disputing institution) and is influenced by it. When
feasible and relevant, I will also nuance national legal culture and
provincial or state legal culture–distinguishing civil law culture
from the common law culture.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND CULTURE
A. Is there a “Modern Legal Culture”?
Law must reflect the currently accepted values, customs and
habits of society to be deemed appropriate, acceptable, and
legitimate, and to be obeyed by its citizens.25 It must adapt to
social and cultural changes, and must evolve and be reformed to
reflect the contemporary, modern legal culture. Princeton

20. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 209.
21. Jackson, supra note 19, at 57.
22. See, e.g., Uniform Law Conference of Canada Website, available at
http://www.ulcc.ca/en/home/ (and in particular, list of uniform legislation) (last
visited September 26, 2009).
23. See, notably, the CIVIL CODE OF QUÉBEC, (S.Q., 1991, c. 64.)
[“C.C.Q.”], which codifies the civil law in the province of Québec.
24. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW,
AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 96, 213 (Harvard University Press 1990).
25. On this point, see: Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness
of Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25:4 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
983 (2006).
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anthropology professor Lawrence Rosen has argued that law is
inherent to culture, and culture to law:
Law is [a] cultural [domain]. Like the marketplace or the
house of worship, the arrangement of space or the
designation of familial roles, law may possess a distinctive
history, terminology, and personnel. But even where
specialization is intense, law does not exist in isolation. To
understand how a culture is put together and operates,
therefore, one cannot fail to consider law; to consider law,
one cannot fail to see it as part of culture.26 [emphasis
added]
Most Western legal theorists interested in legal culture have
presumed that law takes its source in society’s culture, that it is a
“mirror” of society that operates to maintain social order.27 This
so-called “mirror theory” provides that “[l]egal systems do not
float in some cultural void, free of space and time and social
context; necessarily, they reflect what is happening in their own
societies. In the long run, they assume the shape of these societies,
like a glove that molds itself to the shape of a person’s hand.”28
The mirror theory has been challenged, however, notably by
Alan Watson and his legal transplants theory.29 According to
Watson, the laws of one society are primarily borrowed from other
societies; these laws are developed by transplantation of legal rules
between legal systems, or by elaboration and application of
existing legal ideas to other systems by analogy to new
circumstances.30 Hence, Watson essentially argues that law is
insulated or autonomous from its society. Watson’s theory was
criticized by Otto Kahn-Freund, who argued that law is so deeply
26. LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION 4-5 (Princeton
University Press 2006). Rosen ends his book by stating that “as a marvelous
entry to the study of that most central of human features, culture itself, and
hence an open invitation, whatever one’s ultimate interests, to think about what
and who we are.” Id. at 200.
27. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND
SOCIETY (Oxford University Press 2001).
28. Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of
Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 65 (1996).
29. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed., University of Georgia Press 1993).
30. Id.
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embedded in a society’s life that it is not possible to effect a legal
transplantation.31
Studying legal culture is crucial to a better understanding of
law and of our legal institutions.32 Indeed, cultural context
explains why certain legislative choices are made. It also helps
interpret laws and regulations, and justifies precedent. Legal
culture determines “when, why and where people use law, legal
institutions, or legal process; and [why] they use other institutions
or do nothing.”33 It is essential to understanding how law works,
and hence, crucial to the development of law reform:
. . . law reform is doomed to failure if it does not take legal
culture into account . . . legal systems are products of
society–more specifically, of legal culture; hence reform is
a subtle and complex task. One has to take into account the
limits imposed by culture; one has to re-examine whether
the ‘failures’ of law are real failures, or whether we are
neglecting to cut with instead of against the grain.34
If a given society’s values, ideas, and norms change, its legal
system will also change. But is it merely law that moulds itself to
culture, or can culture also mould itself and be influenced by law?
There is most certainly a reciprocal influence between class action
law and culture. Since culture is important to law and law to
culture, and since culture evolves through time and place, there is
such a thing as a modern legal culture or “legal culture of
modernity.”35 In this paper, I will focus on the modern cultural
construction of legality, referring to legal developments and
activity from the last few decades in North America.

31. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Use and Misuse of Comparative Law, 37 MOD.
L. REV. 1 (1974). See also, Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in
British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L.
REV. 12 (1998).
32. Roger Cotterrell, Law in Culture, 17:1 RATIO JURIS 1 (2004) (arguing
for the use of a “sociologically-informed concept of community” in legal
theory); PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW (University of Chicago
Press 1999); Friedman, supra note 12, at 130.
33. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION 76
(Prentice Hall 1977).
34. Id. at 130.
35. Id. at 120.
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B. Culture and Civil Procedure
Civil procedure is culturally constructed. Civil procedure law
and its disputing institutions contain elements of tradition,
common values and ideas that are attributable to identifiable
cultures. Legal academics have demonstrated an interest in this
relationship since the turn of the twentieth century. Austrian
proceduralist Franz Klein argued in 1901, that “the squalid, arid,
neglected phenomenon of civil procedure is . . . strictly connected
with the great intellectual movements of peoples; and that its
varied manifestations are among the most important documents of
mankind’s culture.”36
Decades later, in the early 1970’s, Mauro Cappelletti published
a seminal article discussing the relationship between culture and
civil procedure.37 In it, he reflected on the intellectual and sociopolitical background of European civil procedure reforms, and
underlined the importance for proceduralists of a cultural study of
law.38 A few years later, William Felstiner also wrote about the
influences of social organization on dispute processing, and argued
that dispute processing practices are a product of society’s “values,
its psychological imperatives, its history and its economic, political

36. As quoted by Cappelletti, supra note 4, at 886.
37. Id. See also Mauro Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public Interest Through
the Courts: A Comparativist’s Contribution, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 643 (1975);
Mauro Cappelletti, La protection d’intérêts collectifs et le groupe dans le
procès civil, 27 R.I.D.C. 571 (1975); Richard L. Abel, A Comparative Theory of
Dispute Institutions in Society, LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 217 (1974). Cappelletti also
later wrote a treatise, MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (OUP 1989), in which he argued in favour of a
“world-wide metamorphosis of the judicial process [in which] new types of
procedures, and indeed new roles and responsibilities for judges, have
emerged.” Id. at xx. This has meant, according to Cappelletti, that “procedural
analysis must become ‘contextual’ analysis, for rules, institutions, and processes
must be seen in their societal and political contexts.” Id.
38. Cappelletti, supra note 4, at 886 (“Procedure is not pure form. It is the
meeting point of conflicts, of policies, of ideas . . . Procedure is, in fact, the
faithful mirror of all of the major exigencies, problems and trials of our epoch–
of the immense challenge of our time.”). Antoine Garapon also wrote about
law’s relationship to culture in: GARAPON, supra note 4, at 149 (“la procédure
est le conservatoire de l’esprit national, plus encore que le fond du droit.”);
GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 4, at 17-37.
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and social organization.”39 In his important book entitled The
Faces of Justice and State Authority,40 Mirjan Damaška similarly
argued that procedural systems reflect the “structure of
government” and the “purpose to be served by the administration
of justice.” 41
In his recently published book on law and culture–Law,
Culture and Ritual42–Oscar Chase similarly argues that society’s
choice of dispute resolution procedures results from the choices it
makes according to its social structure, tradition and collective
beliefs, according to its culture:
Dispute processes are in large part a reflection of the
culture in which they are embedded; they are not an
autonomous system that is predominantly the product of
insulated specialists and experts.
More, they are
institutions through which social and cultural life is
maintained, challenged, and altered, or as the same idea has
been expressed, ‘constituted’ or ‘constructed.’ These
institutional practices importantly influence a society and
its culture–its values, metaphysics, social hierarchies and
symbols–even as those practices themselves reflect the
society around them.43 [emphasis added]
Using the example of the Azande Society living in Central
Africa, Chase argues that ways of resolving disputes both reflect
the cultures in which they arose and affect these cultures. He
argues that the Azandes’ belief system of witchcraft, oracles, and
magic used in their dispute resolution practices is reflective of the
main features of the Azande Society. In his view, the Azande

39. William L. F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute
Processing, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 63 (1974).
40. MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (Yale University Press
1986).
41. Id. at 1-15. See also, Mirjan R. Damaška Rational and Irrational Proof
Revisited, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 25 (1997).
42. CHASE, supra note 11. See also, on the relationship between law and
culture: Oscar G. Chase, American ‘Exceptionalism’ and Comparative
Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277 (2002); Chase, supra note 13; Oscar G.
Chase, Some Observations on the Cultural Dimension in Civil Procedure
Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 861 (1997).
43. CHASE, supra note 11, at 2.
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disputing institutions and practices mirror the hierarchical and
gender-biased nature of Azande culture.44 He explains that:
[t]he processes the Azande used for resolving their disputes
were a link in a circular chain from belief to authority to
action and back to belief: the central role of the oracle as a
fact finder supported their system of social stratification,
their ideas about appropriate gender relations, and their
metaphysics. This is the ‘lesson’ of the Azande.45
In his book, Chase focuses on “official” outcome-determining
processes, as opposed to settlement, which he characterizes as an
“informal process.”46 I, on the contrary, will discuss class action
trial and judgment, as well as the class action’s most likely
outcome: settlement. North American class action settlements are
subject to court approval47 and are, in my view, hardly
“informal.”48 Furthermore, class action litigation and settlement
are equally important and relevant to culture. In a way similar to
Chase’s main thesis, I will demonstrate the cultural construction of
North American class actions as dispute resolution institutions.
IV. THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF CLASS ACTION LAW
A. The Class Action’s Nature Encourages the Transmission of
Culture
The class action is a peculiar procedural mechanism that
encourages, by its inherent structure and function, the
communication of elements of culture. It is defined as:
. . . a legal procedure which enables the claims (or part of
the claims) of a number of persons against the same
44. Id. at 22-29.
45. Id. at 29.
46. Chase justifies his choice as follows: “I focus on the ‘official’ outcomedetermining processes precisely because their grounding in culture–and their
constructive power–has been wrongly ignored or denied . . . Informal processes
also reflect social hierarchy, norms, and metaphysics and no doubt capture
different ingredients of culture than the formal processes . . .” Id. at 31.
47. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C), which establishes that a class
action settlement must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate” to be approved
judicially.
48. This procedure will be further discussed below, in IV.C.3.
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defendant to be determined in the one suit. In a class
action, one or more persons (‘representative plaintiff’) may
sue on his or her own behalf and on behalf of a number of
other persons (‘the class’) who have a claim to a remedy
for the same or a similar alleged wrong to that alleged by
the representative plaintiff, and who have claims that share
questions of law or fact in common with those of the
representative plaintiff (‘common issues’).
Only the
representative plaintiff is a party to the action. The class
members are not usually identified as individual parties but
are merely described. The class members are bound by the
outcomes of the litigation on the common issues, whether
favourable or adverse to the class, although they do not, for
the most part, take any active part in that litigation.49
This definition suggests a class action structure that is
eminently social, in a way that encourages sharing elements of
culture. Indeed, the class action involves several different actors: a
class action representative, class action lawyers for the plaintiff(s)
and defendant(s), class members, and one (or more) judge(s).
These actors each have values, ideas, and beliefs they will
implicitly or explicitly disclose during the course of informal
discussions, argument, or judgment. In fact, each party will share
not just its legal arguments and vision, but also, a set of norms.
These norms will be apparent from the questions of law or fact
shared by class members and the class representative. Ultimately,
the judge will decide upon the values, ideas, beliefs, and norms
that should be upheld.50
49. RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL
SYSTEMS–A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3 (Hart Publishing 2004). See also,
Harry Kalven Jr. & Maurice Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941).
50. Many authors, however, have argued that class action litigation is
dominated by class counsel: John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large
Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 896-900 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory
for Private Enforcement of Law Though Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677-678 (1986); Howard M. Downs, Federal Class
Actions: Diminished Protection for the Class and the Case for Reform, 73 NEB.
L. REV. 646, 659-663 (1994). See also, Alon Klement, Who Should Guard The
Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV.
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The class action was originally created–and later used–in
England, as a result of the country’s social, economic, political
structures, and relations “transition[ed] from feudal arrangements
to a more mercantile framework.”51 Indeed, as University of
Miami law Professor Francisco Valdes explains:
In the process of that macro-transition in English society,
powerful institutions and actors, principally the clergy and
the aristocracy, sought to exact from the local population–
the commoners–the tithes and similar types of payments
based on entrenched feudal traditions. The people resisted
and the Lords, the powerful, and the clergy turned to the
law. But of course, it was difficult, cumbersome, and
expensive to go after every little amount due from every
single little labourer or parishioner. So the powerful sought
to go after the whole class of commoners who owed them
something under the legal customs and traditional habits of
feudalism. The courts permitted it, and thus established the
foundations of the class action. . . .
The class action was invented to aid the powerful in
maintaining the social and economic status quo vis-à-vis
the disempowered.52
Accordingly, the class action serves to allow several persons to
take action as a group, changing individual disputes into group
disputes, generating power relations,53 and encouraging the
transmission of culture. Indeed, it gives the class a chance to
develop into “an independent force for change.”54 This “force for

LITIG. 25, 27-28 (2002); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 41-44 (1991).
Accordingly, the power of the class action would then be vehicled through class
counsel’s arguments and actions.
51. Valdes, supra note 4, at 630.
52. Id.
53. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACTION 1(Yale University Press 1987) (“The very decision to
recognize the claimants as a class–a temporary litigative entity–grants them a
form of power.”).
54. Bryant G. Garth, Power and Legal Artifice: The Federal Class Action,
26:2 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 237, 256 (1992). See also, Catherine Piché, The
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change” will not only generate elements of culture, but it will
allow for their communication and publication through precedent,
and, when the class action invites publicity, the mass media.
B. The Modern History of the North American Class Action
Evidences Close Ties with Culture
In this subsection, I will argue that each of the major stages of
the more recent historical evolution of the North American class
action evidences a close relationship with cultural developments in
the U.S. and Canada.
The first stage of modern class action history begins with the
birth of the modern-day class action in 1966, as Rule 23 of the U.S.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was enacted.55 Rule 23 was a
significant milestone in the evolution of collective litigation
because it provided guarantees of procedural fairness for
defendants and absent class members, a system of notice to the
latter class members, and opt-out procedures.56 The motivations
behind its enactment were varied. Certain legal scholars explained
that its enactment responded to social and cultural upheavals of the
1960’s:
. . . the race relations echo of that decade was always in the
committee room. If there was [a] single, undoubted goal of
the committee, the energizing force which motivated the
whole rule, it was the firm determination to create a class
action system which could deal with civil rights and,
explicitly, segregation. The one part of the rule which was
never doubted was (b)(2) and without its high utility, in the
spirit of the times, we might well have had no rule at all.
The other factor is that 1964 was the apogee of the Great
Society. President Johnson was elected with the most
overwhelming vote ever, as of that time, achieved by
anyone. A spirit of them versus us, of exploiters who must

Power of Class Actions, 2:1 CRITICAL ISSUES IN JUSTICE AND POLITICS 77
(2009).
55. See Catherine Piché, supra note 54, at 77.
56. H. Patrick Glenn, The Dilemma of Class Action Reform, 6 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 262, 266 (1986).
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not exploit the whole population, of a fairly simplistic good
guy–bad guy outlook on the world, had its consequences.57
Other legal scholars, such as Professor Judith Resnik, saw the
new rule as having been enacted to respond to the legal
community’s desire to rid of the “confusing” tripartite class action
classification as true, hybrid, or spurious.58 While the Advisory
Committee considered adopting a unitary standard of
classification, it ultimately preserved the different forms of class
actions.59 For the first few years after its enactment, Rule 23
generated criticism and controversy, as companies’ legal exposure
grew and consumers became more litigious than ever with the
availability of this new procedural tool.60 Antitrust, consumer,
environment, securities, and fair employment class actions were
criticized, as they “resounded with Great Society concerns.”61
Whilst Americans abundantly criticized the class action device,
the Canadian province of Québec sought, in 1978, to replicate Rule
23 by enacting class action legislation.62 Québec’s legislation was
57. John P. Frank, “Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on
Class Actions: Memorandum to My Friends on the Civil Rules Committee,”
(December 20, 1996), in Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2 Working
Papers of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on Proposed Amendments to
Rule 23, 266 (1997), as cited in DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (RAND 2000),
available at,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR969
(last
visited September 26, 2009). See also, Valdes, supra note 4, at 640 (“ . . . the
modern class action is an artifact of modernity itself, shaped by the forces of
social, economic, and political modernization: the emergence and consolidation
of “mass” societies.”).
58. Judith Resnik, From ‘Cases’ To ‘Litigation’, 54 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5, 8 (1991).
59. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at n.16.
60. Id. at 15 et seq.
61. Id. at n. 36.
62. Loi sur le recours collectif/An Act Respecting the Class Action, LQ
1978, c. 8, enacting articles 999-1052, Code of Civil Procedure. For accounts of
the history of the Canadian class action, see: Andrew Borrel, The Evolving
Evidentiary Standard for Certification in Canada, 26:6 CLASS ACTION REPORTS
3 (2005); Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE
COMP. & INT’L L. J. 269 (2001); W.A. Bogart, Questioning Litigation’s Role–
Courts and Class Actions in Canada, 62 IND. L. J. 665 (1986-87); Williams,
Consumer Class Actions in Canada–Some Proposals for Reform, 13 OSGOODE
HALL L. J. 1 (1975); John A. Kazanjian, Class Actions in Canada, 11 OSGOODE
HALL L. J. 397 (1973).
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a first in Canada. It contained extensive provisions addressing
interlocutory rights of appeal, the forms of collective recovery, and
the conduct of the lawsuit.63 It also provided a preliminary
screening of the case’s merits–at the so-called “authorization”
stage–and established a governmental agency for the distribution
of public funds to potential class action representatives.64
The advent of the class action in the Canadian province of
Québec evidenced a similar concern for culture. The Québec
legislation was enacted under the Parti Québécois government
headed by René Lévesque, with policy objectives of promoting and
favouring access to justice, and more efficiently enforcing social
and remedial legislation. The legislation was a measure intended
to advance a public interest agenda, along with labour reform and
consumer protection statutes.65 Member of the National Assembly
Fernand Lalonde described it as advancing a “social purpose:”
On behalf of the Official Opposition, we are very satisfied
with the tabling of Bill 39 respecting the class action. The
bill has a social purpose, and is destined to re-establish a
balance between the isolated citizen and companies,
especially the enormous ones with which our society has
become familiar. This bill will provide the citizen with a
tool destined to eliminate the imbalance which sometimes
exists between the consumers and producers of goods . . . 66
[emphasis added]
In the rest of Canada, class action reform followed in 1982,
with the publication of the Ontario Law Reform Commission
Report on Class Actions.67 In this report, the Ontario Commission
identified three objectives for future lawmakers to consider. First,
class actions should ensure judicial economy, because without
63. Glenn, supra note 56, at 267. In Québec, interlocutory rights of appeal
are limited.
64. Id. at 267.
65. Shaun Finn, In a Class all its Own: The Advent of the Modern Class
Action and its Changing Legal and Social Mission, 2(2) CAN. CLASS ACTION
REV. 333 (2005).
66. Id. at 352-353 (citing Journal des débats, Troisième session-31ème
Législature: audition des mémoires sur le projet de loi no. 39 (le 7 mars 1978)
B-262).
67. 1-3 ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON CLASS ACTIONS
(Ministry of the Attorney General 1982).
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them, “most of [the] claims would be litigated individually, leading
to duplicative and costly hearings, at least in situations where there
are too many potential plaintiffs for joinder to be feasible.”68
Second, class actions should facilitate access to justice. Third,
class actions should enable behavioural modification or
deterrence.69 Ultimately, the Ontario Commission recommended
that to meet these objectives, provinces adopt a class certification
procedure similar to U.S. Rule 23.70
The Report’s recommendations and statement of class action
objectives is consistent with early legal culture. Indeed, the
Canadian civil justice system is “premised on the maintenance of
the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and accessibility
to the civil justice system.”71 It is a legal system that strives to
remain not only accessible, but “effective, fair, and efficient.”72
The Ontario Report’s three class action objectives of access to
justice, judicial economy and efficiency, and deterrence are
consistent with the latter civil justice objectives and fundamental
precepts of Canadian legal culture.
Another stage of Canadian class action history was marked by
the 1983 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Naken.73 This case
slowed judicial acceptance and expansion of class actions,
requiring that collective proceedings be filed only pursuant to
properly enacted provincial legislation. By this judgment, the
68. Id. at 118-119.
69. Id. at 145-146 (“. . . the potential of class actions to provide the
incentives for increased compliance with the law, through the prevention of
unjust enrichment or cost internalization, reinforces the ‘judicial economy’ and
‘access’ arguments in favour of the adoption of an expanded class action
procedure in Ontario.”).
70. Bogart, supra note 62, at 692. What the Commission recommended,
however, was that rather than a separate requirement that common questions
predominate over the individual ones, courts consider predominance as just “one
of the factors employed to gauge whether the class action is superior.” Id.
71. THE CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SYSTEMS OF CIVIL JUSTICE TASK
FORCE REPORT 15 (August 1996).
72. Id. at 15, 26 (“These principles lie at the heart of civil justice and
cannot be imperiled. The principles of equity and access are also central. The
maxim ‘justice delayed is justice denied’ and assertions that ‘justice is only for
the rich’ are warning signals. To avoid a dichotomy between ‘perfect’ justice
and ‘accessible’ justice, we must recognize that there are different ways to
achieve procedural fairness and incorporate this knowledge into our system.”).
73. Naken v. General Motors of Canada (1983), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 385
(S.C.C.).
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Supreme Court responded to the then prevalent legal culture
attributing a conservative role to the courts.74 In the years
following Naken, the class action device was profusely criticized,
notably for being a “new form of the arrêt de règlement . . . and a
‘serious judicial usurpation of the functions of the legislature.’”75
The enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,76
however, gave more power to the courts, and brought hope that
Canadian judges would be more receptive to class actions in the
future.77
In the mid-1990’s, a more enthusiastic stage of the modern
North American class action history begun. In Canada, two
provinces enacted class action legislation in response to a new
social impetus favouring collective rights.78 In the U.S., mass tort
and personal injury class actions appeared in great numbers, as did
settlement classes.79 Despite their enthusiasm about the class
action device, Americans also became mindful of its pitfalls. They
grew concerned that it invited, notably, potential conflicts of
74. W.A. Bogart, Naken, The Supreme Court and What Are Our Courts
For?, 9 CAN. BUS. L. J. 280 (1984).
75. H. Patrick Glenn, Class Actions in Ontario and Quebec 62:3 CAN. BAR
REV. 247, 270-73 (1984). See also, H. Patrick Glenn, Class Actions and the
Theory of Tort and Delict, 35 U. TORONTO L. J. 287 (1985) (arguing that class
action is incompatible with tort and delict law); Glenn, supra note 56; Thomas
Cromwell, An Examination of the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on
Class Actions, 15 OTTAWA L. REV. 587 (1983); W.A. Macdonald et al., Ontario
Class Action Reform: Business and Justice System Impacts–A Comment, 9 CAN.
BUS. L. J. 351 (1984). But see, Bogart, supra note 74, at 308 (“. . . I believe it is
the class action . . . which will best answer the needs of group action at the end
of the 20th century.”).
76. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11.
77. Bogart et al., supra note 18, at 2-3.
78. Ontario Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6 and British
Columbia Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50. See also, The Class
Actions Act, S.S. 2001, c. C-12.01 (Saskatchewan); Class Actions Act, S.N.L.
2001, c. C-18.1 (Newfoundland and Labrador); Class Proceedings Act, S.A.
2003, c. C-16.6 (Alberta); Federal Court Rules, S.O.R./98-106 (Rules 334.1 et
seq.). See also, The Class Proceedings Act, C.C.S.M. c. C130 (Manitoba).
Today, class action procedures have been implemented by most Canadian
provinces.
79. On this topic, see John C. Coffee, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the
Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); and more generally,
John C. Coffee, Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000).
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interest between plaintiff attorneys and class members, collusion
between defendants and plaintiff attorneys, and unfair settlements
which award lawyers thousands or millions of dollars in fees and
the smallest amounts of money damages to plaintiffs. These
concerns lead to a renewed interest in class action rule revision and
civil justice reform.80
At the end of the decade, the battle over the utility of class
actions in the U.S. continued,81 reflecting in great part, a
fundamental cultural divide between proponents of individual
versus group rights.82 Indeed, “clashing views on the objective of
Rule 23(b)(3) [were] at the heart of past and present controversy
over revising the class action rule.”83 Nevertheless, the policy
behind the modern class action was confirmed by the Supreme
Court as being to make “marketable” civil claims that otherwise
would not realistically be brought on an individual basis.84
The most recent stage of class action history begun in Canada,
in early 2000, with a trilogy of class action Supreme Court cases.85
In one of them, Dutton, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized
the critical importance of class actions:
The class action plays an important role in today’s world.
The rise of mass production, the diversification of
corporate ownership, the advent of the mega-corporation,
and the recognition of environmental wrongs have all
contributed to its growth . . . The class action offers a

80. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at 22 et seq. Notably of interest is the
1995 Castano decision, in which a Louisiana district court certified a nationwide
class action on behalf of smokers asking damages for addiction; see Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995). But see, Castano v.
American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), which effectively
overturned the trial court’s certification on interlocutory appeal.
81. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at 35-37. See also, Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 523, 559
(1996).
82. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at 49.
83. Id.
84. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting
Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp, 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
85. Western Canadian Shopping Centres v. Dutton, (2001) 2 S.C.R. 534,
Rumley v. British Columbia, (2001) 3 S.C.R. 184 and Hollick v. City of
Toronto, (2001) 3 S.C.R. 158.
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means of efficiently resolving such disputes in a manner
that is fair to all parties.86
This favourable caselaw caused an increase in the number of
class action filings in Canada, from 15 filings per year five years
ago, to approximately 120-150 per year at present.87 It also
brought high certification rates throughout Canada. Between the
years 2002 and 2007, approximately 57% of all cases were
authorized in Québec, compared to, certification rates of 52%, 75%
and 45% in Ontario, British Columbia, and in the Federal Court of
Canada, respectively.88
By comparison, U.S. controversy over the class action led to
three major class action law reforms–the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995,89 Rule 23 amendments of 2003,90
and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,91 which sought to
tighten procedural protections to prevent abuse of the class action
mechanism. They also sought to regulate the selection of class
counsel and limit their fees, encouraged interlocutory appeals, and
limited settlement class actions and coupon settlements. These
reforms were implemented in response to a high level of mistrust
of lawyers–especially class action ones–and of collective
procedural mechanisms.92 Indeed, the PSLRA was adopted to “go
after the greatest abuse . . . lawyers who do not represent the

86. Dutton, at ¶ 26.
87. Bogart et al., supra note 18, at 16.
88. Id. at 25-26.
89. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in 15 U.S.C.) (“PSLRA”).
PSLRA raised the standard of pleading for securities lawsuits and changed the
selection process of class representatives and class counsel.
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c), (e), (g), (h) (as amended in 2003).
91. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in 28 U.S.C.) (“CAFA”).
CAFA significantly expanded federal subject matter jurisdiction over state law
class actions. Indeed, it allows federal jurisdiction over class actions based on
minimal diversity and an aggregate amount in controversy of five million
dollars, and removal by any defendant, even an in-state defendant. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (d) (2), (6) (Supp. V. 2005) and § 1453 (b). The practical result of
CAFA, accordingly, is to allow all large scale class actions to be filed or
removed to federal court.
92. Howard M. Erichson, Symposium: Fairness to Whom–Perspectives on
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (2008).
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general public but represent themselves.”93 These reform efforts
and steady concern for procedural abuse, however, have not
affected the number of U.S. federal class action filings or
removals, which have risen steadily over the last decade.94
Accordingly, this most recent stage of class action history
evidences, once more, a true concern for culture. Indeed, in our
mass production, mass consumption economy, concerns for
procedural and contractual fairness and for product safety are now
adequately and efficiently addressed by collective redress for
breaches in various areas of the law such as tort, consumer
protection, or contract law.
C. The Class Action as a “Mirror of Societal Structure” and
Culture
The class action was created in parallel to a decline in the
individualist conceptions of trial and justice.95 It is, and will likely
remain, closely tied to its social and cultural setting.96 W.A.
Bogart argued a quarter of a century ago that the class action
“[reflects] how society functions” and “[mirrors] societal

93. Statement to Congress of Senator d’Amato, quoted in Howard M.
Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593,
1603 (2008).
94. THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: THIRD INTERIM
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
2 (2007). This Report explains that there was a 46% increase in federal court
class actions filings or removals during six-month periods from mid-2001
through mid-2006.
95. Cappelletti, “La protection”, supra note 37, at 596.
96. See Yeazell, supra note 53, at 267 (“This chapter, like the entire study,
argues that one cannot understand the nature of group litigation separate from
the social setting that produces and the state that permits and regulates it.”);
Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of
the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 895-896 (1977) (“. . . the interaction
between group and law in the earliest reported instances of group litigation
reminds us that the law’s position as a social artifact, and the courts’ function as
agencies of social and economic control, preclude easy assumptions that
formally similar procedural devices play similar roles in different social
circumstances.”).
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structure.”97 He also argued that class actions respond to a
collective vision of litigation because they:
. . . allow litigation to be brought in a form responsive to
questions concerning the activities of entities whose
conduct can scarcely avoid having mass ramifications.
And seeing alleged wrongdoing by these aggregates in the
light of the consequences for groups is vital in order to
assess and to respond to such conduct. To force litigation
to be brought on an individual basis is to embrace a vision
of the structure of society which–and in many important
ways, regrettably–no longer exists. To force it into the
traditional mold of litigation in the name of individualism
may purport to celebrate formally the value of each one of
us but, in reality, it prevents an effective means of
confronting such aggregates with their capacity to pose a
greater threat to that individuality.
. . . [class actions] reflect a reality that sooner or later
must be mirrored in litigation that affects so significantly
the issues people bring to courts. Canada is a highly
industrialized and regulated society which will repeatedly
generate policies, issues, and consequences that the courts
can only respond to adequately by approaching them with
an understanding of how powerful entities function and
affect, and at times injure, groups and individuals.98
[emphasis added].
Relating the class action to the social and cultural environment
in which it exists and operates is logical, considering the inherent
structure and function of the class action.99 But this relationship is
also questionable in the North American context. Canada has a bijuridical legal system in which common and civil law cohabitate
and interact. Its provinces and territories each have their own
specific legal system and culture. Quebec, however, has a mixed
97. Bogart, supra note 74, at 280-281. See also, Bogart et al., supra note
18, at 2 (where Bogart links class action reform to culture and politics); Bogart,
supra note 62, at 697 (“[c]lass actions claim our attention because they raise
questions concerning how society is structured and run–the manner in which the
nation struggles with the problems that a highly industrialized and regulated
country must face at the close of the twentieth century.”).
98. Bogart, supra note 62, at 699-700.
99. See IV.A.
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jurisdiction, in which criminal law and several other federal
matters are derived from the common law, while most other areas
of the law are codified and of civil law facture. The United States
has one state–Louisiana–and one territory–Puerto Rico–that are
governed for a large part by civil law. In addition, many of its
southwest states such as Texas, Arizona, New Mexico and Nevada
were originally Mexican territory, and have inherited several
unique features from the civil law, which applied when they were
part of Mexico.
Accordingly, it is difficult to argue in favour of a unified, truly
Canadian or American legal culture. This difficulty is accentuated
by the fact that social, political, economical and cultural
developments in the United States reciprocally influence those of
Canada, in part because the two countries share a common border,
language, and cultural heritage. In the class action context, U.S.
legal developments also influence the development of Canadian
law. And since the Canadian and American class action regimes
are similar (though not identical), they are subject to a constant
cross-fertilization of ideas.
Setting aside these difficulties, North American class action
law developments in the last decade have been, and will likely
continue to be, culturally constructed. This influence can be
appreciated in light of the three following characteristics of North
American contemporary culture: (1) access to justice; (2)
managerial judging; and (3) the preference for settlement.
1. Access to Justice
This first cultural characteristic of access to justice is a
principal objective of the North American civil justice system, and
is reflected in North American class action developments. In 2006,
then Chief Justice of Ontario Roy McMurtry explained that
[t]here is no doubt that the provision of civil justice is
integral to a viable democratic society. As you know, our
system of civil justice is premised on the maintenance of
the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the
openness of the courts, and it can be described as having
two overarching objectives: (1) to provide Canadians with
a means by which they can resolve their disputes peacefully
and in a timely way before an independent and impartial
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decision-maker; and (2) to ensure that this public dispute
resolution “machinery” is accessible to all Canadians, both
in terms of cost and complexity.100 [emphasis added]
Accordingly, access to justice is the foundation of Canada’s
civil society and a major concern of civil justice. It is an important
element of Canadian culture. Indeed, “in a liberal democracy, all
people should have an equal right to participate in every institution
where law is debated, created, found, organized, administered,
interpreted and applied.”101 Access to justice is considered to be
not a goal, but a “process,” a “positive act of creating a more just
society,” an “empowerment that citizens claim for themselves.”102
Consequently, it is also the “principal justice challenge” for the
future.103
Access to justice is, similarly, a fundamental right of primary
concern in American civil justice. It is central to achieving
democracy in civil processes. Access to justice is implicit in the
principle of “equal justice under law:” “[t]he underlying
assumption is that social justice is available through procedural
justice. [But] those who receive their ‘day in court’ do not always
feel that ‘justice has been done’ . . . Formal rights can be
prohibitively expensive to enforce, successful plaintiffs can be
informally blacklisted, and legislatures may overturn legal rulings
that lack political support.”104 Currently, U.S. civil processes fail
to ensure that a lawyer is made available for each and every injured
plaintiff, and that processes are fair and comprehensible to the
average claimant.105 In fact, while access to justice has been
100. R. Roy McMurtry, “Civil Justice Reform Conference: Phase II – Into
the Future,” paper presented to the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, December
7, 2006, available at http://cfcj-fcjc.org/docs/2006/mcmurtry-en.pdf (last visited
September 26, 2009), at 4-5.
101. Roderick A. Macdonald, “Access to Justice in 2003–Scope, Scale,
Ambitions”, paper presented to the Symposium on Access to Justice,
May 2003, Law Society of Upper
Canada, available at
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/convjune03_access.pdf (last visited September 26,
2009), at 1.
102. Id. at 6-7.
103. McMurtry, supra note 100, at 3.
104. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 5-6 (OUP 2004).
105. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Again, Still, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1014 (2005); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles
to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 369 (2003).
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considered critical to Canadian policy debates and legal reform, it
has been largely ignored in the United States.106
In the class action context, access to justice is considered to be
the most important prerequisite and benefit to the class action, and
a principal objective of class action statutes.107 In Dutton, the
Supreme Court of Canada held that:
. . . by allowing fixed litigation costs to be divided over a
large number of plaintiffs, class actions improve access to
justice by making economical the prosecution of claims that
would otherwise be too costly to prosecute individually.
Without class actions, the doors of justice remain closed to
some plaintiffs, however strong their legal claims. Sharing
costs ensures that injuries are not left unremedied.108
[emphasis added]
Similarly, prominent American legal scholars have explained
that: “. . . when Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
was amended, . . . the class action device was given the potential
broadly to affect access to court. That appears to have been one of
the goals of the 1966 amendments.”109
Without the economy of scale that class actions afford, many
individuals would otherwise be without recourse because their
claim is too small, complex, or risky to be adjudicated
individually.110 The Supreme Court of Canada Naken case,111 for
example, was one where the plaintiffs could not have sued other
than collectively. Indeed, the cost of proving the validity of the
claim of manufacturing or design defects in automobile products
was too high to have the claim adjudicated individually,
particularly since no personal injury had resulted.
106. Rhodes, supra note 105, at 1013 (“Few issues are more central to our
legal system and more neglected in our legal policy debates than access to
justice.”).
107. See, notably, Hollick, supra note 85, at ¶ 19. See also, ONTARIO LAW
REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 139 (“effective access to justice is a
precondition to the exercise of all other legal rights”).
108. Dutton, supra note 85, at ¶ 28.
109. Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in
Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675,
684 (1997).
110. See, e.g., Developments–The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1752, 1806-1807 (2000).
111. Naken, supra note 73.
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Judges and legal academics have confirmed that the use of the
class action promotes and furthers access to justice.112
Accordingly, since the class action is fundamentally influenced by
one of the principal elements of North American legal culture–
access to justice–it is also reflective of culture.
2. Managerial Judging
A second facet of class action law that evidences a concern for
cultural context is the evolution of the role of the judge toward
increased managerial judging. In the last decade, legal culture in
North America–and elsewhere–has required that judges become
active managers of increasingly more complex cases. Class action
law in Canada and in the U.S. has responded to this cultural
context by providing–and sometimes mandating–more active
judicial management in group proceedings.
Traditionally, the judicial system provided that parties to a
dispute controlled its progress, subject only to a loose control by
the courts, the whole in conformity with the adversarial
112. Current Chief Justice of Ontario Warren K. Winkler recognized the
access to justice function of class actions in a speech on April 30, 2008 (“Class
proceedings have created the opportunity for minor lawsuits, which would be
completely impractical if advanced on an individual basis, to be clustered
together and carried forward by experienced, motivated lawyers. Many
legitimate claims, which would never have been brought forward otherwise,
have been recognized and addressed by the courts.”): Warren K. Winkler,
“Access to Justice–Remarks”, paper presented at the Canadian Club
of
London,
April
30,
2008,
available
at
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/coa/en/ps/speeches/accessjustice.htm
(last
visited Sept. 26, 2009). See also Valdes, supra note 4, at 649 (“[t]hroughout the
zigs and zags of time, the virtue of the class action was and is in the effort to
provide access to justice–to deliver justice to those who don’t have access to
justice. It is the virtue that motivates and justifies the modern class action
specifically.”); PIERRE-CLAUDE LAFOND, LE RECOURS COLLECTIF, LE ROLE DU
JUGE ET SA CONCEPTION DE LA JUSTICE: IMPACT ET EVOLUTION 241 et seq. (Yvon
Blais 2006) (“La relative indifférence de la magistrature à l’égard de l’accès des
citoyens aux tribunaux que d’aucuns lui reprochaient a cédé progressivement sa
place à une plus grande conscience de la problématique et à un souci de l’égalité
effective de tous devant le prétoire.”); Schweyer v. Laidlaw Carriers Inc. (2000),
44 CPC (4th) 236 (SCJ), at ¶ 44 (where the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
interpreted the Ontario CPA criterion of preferability to require that the
determination of the common issues advance the proceeding in accordance with
the Act’s objective of promoting access to justice.).
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tradition.113 In recent years, however, this position has changed
dramatically in Canadian and American jurisdictions, as new rules
were enacted regarding case management, rules on pre-trial
conferences, and other judicial activism measures. Judges have
become increasingly involved with parties in chambers,
supervising case preparation and management, helping shape the
litigation, and encouraging settlement.114 They have become
“mediators, negotiators, and planners–as well as adjudicators.”115
This contemporary judicial attitude is the result of a social and
cultural trend characterized by Mauro Cappelletti as the
“massification” of cases:
Our contemporary society . . . is frequently characterized
as a “mass production–mass consumption” civilization.
That characterization reflects, no doubt, a typical feature of
modern economies in all parts of the world–
“massification.” But this feature extends far beyond the
economic sector; it characterizes social relationships,
feelings and conflicts as well. 116
As Cappelletti discusses, the new collective and social rights
created as a result of this “massification” phenomenon require
“active intervention by the state and other public entities.”117
Judicial case management falls into this type of intervention.
In the class action context, judges have revised their traditional
role in litigation, becoming more actively involved in the
prosecution of the class action, in part to protect absent class
parties.118 Their new role has also been motivated by the
113. Hugh F. Landerkin, Q.C. & Andrew J. Pirie, Judges as Mediators:
What’s the Problem with Judicial Dispute Resolution in Canada?, 82 CAN. BAR
REV. 249 (2003); Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in
Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257 (1986); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
114. Resnik, supra note 113, at 377-379.
115. Id. at 379.
116. Cappelletti, supra note 37.
117. Id. at 646.
118. Glenn, supra note 75, at 268-269; ONTARIO LAW REFORM
COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 445. In fact, the class action represents a new
model of litigation that requires a change in the court’s adjudicating role,
because “[t]he nature of the right asserted based upon a mass harm, the
representation of absentee members whose interests may not coincide in all
respects and the need to protect those interests, the assessment and distribution
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increasing size and complexity of class actions lawsuits–a similar
“massification” of sorts of the class action, necessitating more
“hands-on” management.119 As such, class action judges have
become “active systems manager[s],”120 who are no longer neutral,
passive, and aloof, but are rather, principally involved in the
litigation.121
Today, case management is provided for in legislation such as
the U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(12), which
authorizes the judge to adopt “special procedures for managing
potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex
issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof
problems.” In Canada, Article 1045 of the Québec Code of Civil
Procedure similarly gives judges broad judicial powers to hasten
the progress of the class action or to simplify the proof, on the
condition that they do not prejudice a party or the members. A
Québec class action division was also created in 2006 to help
manage cases. As for Canadian national class action cases, which
require even greater management, courts have used their case
management powers to coordinate class actions in different
provinces that involve the same subject matter, with the explicit
consent of the class action parties, lawyers, and judges involved.122

of monetary relief in innovative ways as well as the fashioning of other relief,
sometimes on the basis of competing representations within the class, and the
procedural aspects of class actions such as the motion for certification, are all
factors which can make the class action, both in appearance and performance, a
clear departure from the traditional model of litigation.” See Bogart, supra note
74, at 303-304. See also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291 (1976) (“I think it unlikely that the
class action will ever be taught to behave in accordance with the precepts of the
traditional model of adjudication.”).
119. ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 446.
120. Glenn, supra note 75, at 269, quoting Arthur R. Miller, Of
Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and the ‘Class
Action Problem, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 667 (1979).
121. Bogart, supra note 74, at 302.
122. Bogart et al., supra note 18, at 21. See Ontario Court
Practice
Direction
Number 8
for
proceedings
under
the
Class
Proceedings
Act,
1992,
available
at
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/scj/en/notices/pd/classproceedings.htm
(last
visited September 26, 2009) (“In accordance with the statutory scheme, the
judge hearing the pre-trial motions will case manage the proceeding.”).
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In sum, the emergence of the contemporary requirement of
class action management is culturally constructed because it was
motivated by the social and cultural phenomenon of
“massification” of litigation in North America and around the
world generally.
3. The Preference for Settlement
A third facet of class action law that evidences a concern for
culture is the preference for settlement, as opposed to adjudication
by trial and judgment.
The recent decade in North America has seen a gradual decline
in trial rates and a corresponding increase in the number of out of
court settlements.123 This trend results from a combination of
different factors: the costs of litigating are high and prohibitive,
litigation is increasingly complex and lengthy, judges implicitly
encourage parties to settle as they are overwhelmed by crowded
court dockets, and there are growing numbers of lawyers able to
achieve negotiated settlements.124 In Canada, for instance, there
has indeed been such a decline in the number of yearly trials.125
University of Wisconsin law professor Marc Galanter
published several articles in which he discussed the disappearance
of “[t]he promise of full-blown adjudication in a public forum, [or
the] ‘day in court,’” in favour of “‘bargaining in the shadow of the

123. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, ‘Most Cases Settle’: Judicial Promotion
and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1387 (1994) (95% of
cases in the U.S. federal system are resolved prior to trial). In Canada, see
Donalee Moulton, “Vanishing Trials: Out-of-Court Settlements on the Rise,”
THE
LAWYERS
WEEKLY,
October
17,
2008,
available
at
http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=784
(last
visited September 26, 2009).
124. Marc Galanter, The Hundred Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty
Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1256, 1264 (2005). See also Judith Resnik,
Migrating, Morphing and Vanishing: The Empirical Normative Puzzles of
Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIR. STUD. 3 (2004).
125. See, e.g., conference papers from the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice,
available at http://cfcj-fcjc.org/publications/itf-en.php (last visited September
26, 2009); Pierre Noreau, La justice est-elle soluble dans la procedure?–repères
sociologiques pour une réforme de la procédure civile, 40 CAHIERS DE DROIT
33 (1999).
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law.’”126 Galanter attributed the gradual decline in trial rates to a
transformation in the judicial culture: “a great increase in judicial
case management at the early stages of litigation, a substantial
increase in nontrial adjudication before judges, and a substantial
dose of outsourcing to ADR providers . . .”127 He argued that the
recent judicial ideology was about actively case managing and
promoting settlements, and considered the primary role of courts to
have grown to be “less enunciating and enforcing public norms and
more facilitating resolution of disputes.”128
In the class action context, statistics about the number of
settlements, before or after certification, are scarce. Even when
statistics exist and are available, their accuracy and reliability is
limited, given the fact that settlements of non-certified class
actions are privately negotiated and completed, and do not need the
court’s approval to be made effective.129 As such, the details of
these private settlements are never scrutinized by the courts or the
public.
Nevertheless, existing statistics provide that trials are rare and
out of court settlements, increasingly prevalent.130 In fact, it
126. Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 13
(2006); Galanter, supra note 124, at 1264.
127. Galanter, supra note 124, at 1265-1266.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1)(e), which make clear that court
approval is required for a settlement or voluntary dismissal only if the class
action is certified. In Canada, the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador similarly allow the
settlement of uncertified class actions without the approval of the court. Ontario
and New Brunswick, however, require the judicial approval of all settlements–
including those of uncertified class actions. See, e.g., Section 29 (2) of the
Ontario Class Proceedings Act.
130. W.K. Branch & J.C. Kleefeld, Settling a Class Action (or How to
Wrestle an Octopus, in CANADIAN INSTITUTE CONFERENCE ON LITIGATING
TOXIC TORTS AND OTHER MASS WRONGS 2000 Tab XVI, 8-10 (Canadian
Institute 2000); Willging et al., Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four
Federal
District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee
on
Civil
Rules,
1996,
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule23.pdf/$File/rule23.pdf
(last
visited September 26, 2009), at 60 (where the authors found that a substantial
majority of certified class actions resulted in settlements. The percentage of
certified class actions ending in settlement ranged from 62% to 100%, while
settlement rates for cases not certified ranged from 20% to 30%.). See also
Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 567 (1991); Sylvia R. Lazos,
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appears that only a “tiny fraction” of all class actions (certified or
not) go to trial, a rate consistent with ordinary litigation.131 Class
adjudication occurs mostly at the early stages of litigation, before
trial, either by way of summary judgment or motion to dismiss, or
after settlement was approved at the fairness hearing.132 Moreover,
when a settlement does occur, there is a general tendency for
courts to approve it without substantive changes,133 arguably in
keeping with a certain inclination toward or preference for out of
court settlements, as opposed to often lengthy and complex
traditional court adjudication.

Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian during
Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308, 308 (1985).
131. Nicholas M. Pace, Class Actions in the United States of America,
(2007), report prepared for the Globalization of Class Actions Conference,
Oxford
University,
December
2007,
available
at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/USA__Nati
onal_Report.pdf (last visited September 26, 2009), at 91 (“Evidence suggests
that the rate of trial may be lower than what might be seen in non-class litigation
involving similar claims and defenses. Evidence also suggests that outcomes
other than trial or settlement are involved in a larger fraction of class actions
than in non-class litigation. In only those cases with certified class actions, class
settlements are by far the most common result.”); Bogart et al., supra note 18, at
21. Bogart cites in footnote 99 a Québec author, Pierre-Claude Lafond, who
compiled statistics for his book, and argued that in Québec, “there remain very
few final judgments in class action cases. The majority of class action cases end
by out of court settlement. From 1979 to 2004, 151 actions ended by way of
settlement, against 32 judgments favourable to the class. Therefore, more than
three favourable outcomes out of four (82.5%) result in settlement. Moreover,
the data evidences the fact that more cases are organized at the stage of
authorization than at the stage of the lawsuit’s origin or foundation, by a ratio of
2 to 1 (98 against 53)” [translation]. See LAFOND, supra note 112, at 35. Also
see generally Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 79.
132. See, e.g., Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIR. STUD. 459, 487 (2004).
133. See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23
to Address Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 141 (1996) (In an
empirical analysis of Rule 23 practiced in four American judicial districts, the
authors found that “[a]pproximately 90% or more of the proposed settlements
were approved without changes.”). In Canada, there exists no such authority to
my knowledge. However, I can affirm, based on an extensive review of
Canadian class action settlements conducted in the context of my doctoral thesis
project, that Canadian courts do similarly tend to approve settlements without
changes, and in fact do so quasi-automatically.
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In both Canadian and American class action law, court
approval is required to effect class action settlements. The threepart standard for such approval is the fairness, reasonableness, and
adequacy of the proposed settlement as a whole.134 This standard,
however, does not properly help determine what to look for when
scrutinizing class settlements and assessing their fairness–or
unfairness. Hence, courts have developed several factors that they
consider helpful and important in evaluating class settlement
fairness.135 These factors are worded somewhat differently in the
various states and provinces, yet they also contain indeterminate
and subjective concepts that do not offer any account of the
process judges should follow to review such settlements, or any
indicia of which settlements should be approved or denied. As
such, the process by which settlement “fairness,” “reasonableness,”
and “adequacy” of settlement is evaluated is very subjective, and
depends on context–cultural context, notably.
Relating class action settlements to their cultural context is
complex, however, because settlements have many variables that
affect their process. They involve several actors with diverging
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C) establishes that a class action settlement
must be “fair, reasonable, and adequate” to be approved judicially. By contrast,
in Canada, there is no equivalent statutory provision, such that courts have had
to develop a similar standard for the judicial oversight of class action
settlements: Dabbs v. Sun Life Assurance (1998) O.J. No. 1598 (Gen. Div.) at ¶
11. See also Killough v. Canadian Red Cross Society, (2007) B.C.J. No. 1262
(B.C.S.C.); Rideout v. Health Labrador Corp., (2007) N.J. No. 292 (Nwfd’l and
Lab. S.C.) at ¶ 138 (adding an element of “good faith” to the test); Sparvier v.
Canada (Att. Gen.), (2006) S.J. No. 752 (Sask. C.Q.B.); Pelletier c. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., REJB 1998-05914 (Qc.Sup.Ct.) at 10; Landry c. Syndicat du
transport de Montréal, (2006) Q.J. no. 3043 (S.C.) (QL) at ¶ 31.
135. American caselaw [Federal]: In re Prudential Insurance Co. America
Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 316–24 (3d Cir. 1998);
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463, 18 Fed.R.Serv. 2d 637 (2d
Cir. 1974) (implied overruling on other grounds recognized by, U.S. Football
League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1989)).
Canadian caselaw: Dabbs, at ¶ 13; Jeffery v. Nortel Networks Corp., (2007)
B.C.J. No. 90 (S.C.) at ¶ 18; White v. Canada (Att. Gen.), (2006) B.C.J. No. 760
(S.C.); Northwest v. Canada (Att. Gen.), (2006) A.J. No. 1612 (Alta. C.Q.B.) at
¶ 23 et seq. See also, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, (Federal Judicial
Center,
4th
ed.
2004),
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/mcl4.pdf/$file/mcl4.pdf (last visited
September 26, 2009), at 316, ¶ 21.62 (which lists the factors relevant to
assessing class action settlement fairness).
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interests, ideas, opinions, and values. Moreover, the issue of
settlement fairness differs in importance for the different actors
and for the case at stake,136 and is very difficult to define. As
Rosen rightly argued, the meaning of concepts such as “fairness”
will depend on “assumptions, reinforced across numerous
domains, that characterize the culture of which law is a part:”
. . . context is crucial: When we hear a court speak of “the
conscience of the community,” “the reasonable man,” or
“the clear meaning of the statute,” when we watch judges
grapple with parenthood as a natural or functional
phenomenon, or . . . we know that the meaning of these
concepts will come not just from the experience of legal
officials or some inner propulsion of the law but from those
broader assumptions, reinforced across numerous
domains, that characterize the culture of which law is a
part. And when we seek law outside of specialized
institutions—when a kinsman mediates a dispute or
members of a settlement use gossip or an informal
gathering to articulate their vision of society—the terms by
which they grasp their relationships and order them will
necessarily be suffused by their implications in many
interconnected domains.137
Ultimately, fairness remains a “pragmatic ideal,” and the
fairness of procedures relative, because it “turns on the social ends
that they serve.”138 In the same way, the fairness of class action
procedure in the settlement context will depend on the social ends
that class actions serve. For example, in Epstein v. First Marathon
Inc.,139 the Ontario Superior Court denied a class settlement
because it arose from a strike suit.140 The Court used its powers
under the Ontario CPA to refuse to allow the proposed settlement,
because it would have provided no benefit to the proposed
136. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute is it Anyway?: A
Philosophical and Democratic Defence of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO
L.J. 2663, 2666 (1995).
137. ROSEN, supra note 26, at 6-7.
138. Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 979
(1992).
139. Epstein v. First Marathon Inc. (2000), 2 B.L.R. (3d) 30 (Ont. S.C.).
140. A strike suit is a suit based on unmeritorous claims, often brought as a
way to extort from the defendant a favourable or inflated settlement.
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shareholder class and a substantial payment to class counsel. The
Court held that the proposed settlement would make “a mockery”
of the public policy upon which Ontario’s class action legislation is
based and would be counter-productive to “the important policy
objectives of the statute, . . . access to justice, judicial economy
and behaviour modification.” 141 The Court further emphasized its
disfavour of strike suits by barring the plaintiff lawyers from
receiving any money by way of the settlement.
Setting aside the Epstein case, very few class action settlements
are refused in Canada, or asked to be modified for later approval.
Most proposed settlements are accepted and approved “as is.”
This tendency evidences a judicial preference for settlement,
justified by Galanter’s argument of a transformation of the judicial
culture in favour of fewer trials and more settlements.
V. THE INFLUENCE OF CLASS ACTIONS ON NORTH AMERICAN
LEGAL CULTURE
Class actions typically involve important topics that have a
significant impact on society. They address issues such as product
liability for defective pharmaceutical products,142 consumer
protection for gambling activities,143 wrongful dismissals,144 or
securities fraud.145 Where social harm is done to a large number of
individuals, class actions are used to redress a large-scale public
141. Epstein, supra note 139, at ¶ 69-71.
142. Deborah Hoisington and Stefanie Puls, and Johnson and Johnson Inc.,
Janssen-Ortho Inc., Canderm Pharma Inc., ABC1 Company, et al., filed
December
9,
2008
(British
Columbia),
available
at
http://www.cba.org/ClassActions/Class_2008/britishcolumbia/main/12-092008_Puls.aspx (last visited September 26, 2009).
143. Chartrand v. British Columbia Lottery Corporation, filed Nov. 16,
2008 (British Columbia); Trowell v. Atlantic Lottery Corporation Inc., filed
November 25, 2008 (Nova Scotia), Manon Cartier and André Bégin v. LotoQuébec,
filed
November
24,
2008
(Québec),
available
at
http://www.cba.org/ClassActions/Class_2008/britishcolumbia/main/11-262008_Chartrand.aspx (last visited September 26, 2009).
144. Lisa Harrison and Herman Pimentel and Augustus Myers v. Simmons
Canada Inc., filed November 24, 2008 (Ontario), available at
http://www.cba.org/ClassActions/Class_2008/ontario/main/11-242008_Simmons.aspx (last visited September 26, 2009).
145. Ménard c. Matteo et al., filed November, 2008 (Québec), available at
http://www.cba.org/ClassActions/Class_2008/quebec/main/11-072008_Matteo.aspx (last visited September 26, 2009).
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wrong. Society benefits from them because they promote the
efficient use of judicial resources and help ensure greater
compliance with laws and regulations, by making wrongdoers
accountable for what they did, and encouraging behavioural
modification.
But do class actions also affect or influence culture? Does
class action reform effect changes in the way people live their
lives; does it lead to cultural change?146 While a definite
conclusion on these questions would ideally need to be supported
by exhaustive qualitative data on the changing culture of litigation
practices in North America, I believe that the answer is “yes.”
Even without such data, I will argue below that evidence of this
culture change can be found in, notably, a) the judicial institutions
and the role of judges, and b) the legal profession. In subsection c),
I will illustrate my argument that class actions influence culture by
discussing the infamous Canadian national Residential Schools
Settlement.
A. The Judicial Institutions and the Role of Judges
The emergence and increasing number of class action filings–
indicative of the popularity of the class action device–has
influenced the organization and philosophy of judicial institutions,
and has changed the role of judges involved in class action
litigation. Indeed, the class action device has required that courts
be better organized, to manage more complex proceedings.
Notably, these courts have created class action divisions or
chambers, and have started using specific codes to refer to class
proceedings in computerized court databases. They have also felt
the need to hire additional staff to manage the large amount of
paperwork generated by the class action device. In the Canadian
province of Québec, for instance, the Fonds d'aide aux recours
collectifs was created to help finance class action suits in first
146. See, e.g., Lynn Mather, Conclusion: The Mobilizing Potential of Class
Actions, 57 IND. L.J. 451 (1982), citing articles discussing attempts to reform–
through class action litigation–services provided by public schools (Rosenberg
& Philips, The Institutionalization of Conflict in the Reform of Schools: A Case
Study of Court Implementation of the PARC Decree, 57 IND. L. J. 425 (1982),
and public hospitals (Paul-Shaheen & Perlstadt, Class Action Suits and Social
Change: The Organization and Impact of the Hill-Burton Cases, 57 IND. L.J.
385 (1982)).
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instance or on appeal, and to publish information about class action
filings.
In fact, the class action has required, by its complexity and
physical volume, not just greater court organization, but better case
management. Furthermore, and as discussed in part above,147 the
emergence and prevalence of the class action has influenced the
role of judges in class action litigation, and along with it, their
philosophy in handling such cases.
For example, in the civil law system of Quebec, the advent of
the class action has forced class action judges to move from a
typically individualistic conception of justice, and of the class
action, to a more collective one. Indeed, the civil adjudicative
process has traditionally been marked by a liberal political
philosophy,148 in which the individual is free to sue or not sue, to
defend himself or not, and during the course of litigation, to choose
which terms and which procedural devices are ideal to argue his
case and present the facts and law.149 As such, Quebec judges
involved in class action litigation originally supported this purely
individualistic conception of collective justice.150 These judges
considered the class action to be a series of individual actions, an
aggregate of individual claims which will be proven by the class
representative.151 In recent years, however, they have begun
setting aside the individualistic conception of the class action in
favour of a more collective one, recognizing the collective
dimension of the individual prejudice and the collective effect of
the breach.152 Accordingly, the advent and evolution of the class
action has, in that province, influenced legal culture because it has
changed the judges’ conception of civil adjudication.
Furthermore, in the United States, common law Canada, and in
some European countries such as Belgium, Germany, and France,
147. See IV.C.2.
148. Glenn, supra note 75, at 264.
149. Id.
150. LAFOND, supra note 112, at 219. See also, CAPPELLETTI, supra note 37
(where he argues that “[e]ven the most sacred principles . . . must . . . be
reconsidered in view of the changed needs of contemporary societies. . . . [A]n
individualistic vision of procedural due process should give way to, or be
integrated with, a social or collective concept of due process.”).
151. See, e.g., Gosselin v. Québec (Proc. Gén.), (2002) 4 R.C.S. 429, 476477.
152. LAFOND, supra note 112, at 229-230.
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the class action has brought a “profound metamorphosis” in
traditional judicial processes and philosophy.153 It has caused:
. . . A real explosion of the traditional concepts, rules and
structures of the judicial process . . . Standing to sue has
been granted to ‘private attorney generals’ or ‘ideological
plaintiffs,’ and such plaintiffs–hether individuals or
organizations–have been regarded as the ‘adequate
representatives’ of numbers and classes of people, most of
whom might not even know that a ‘representative action’ is
being brought ‘on their behalf.’
...
judges [must–and have–become] the protectors not only of
the traditional individual rights, but also of the new diffuse,
collective and fragmented rights and interests which are so
characteristics of our mass civilization. . . . inevitably new
powers and responsibility [have fallen] upon the
judiciary.154 [emphasis added]
B. The Legal Profession
The class action has also brought changes in the culture of the
legal profession. The prevalence of class action litigation and the
higher settlement rates have changed the way lawyers interact with
clients. These lawyers have become “entrepreneurs,”155 seeking
class action representatives actively, almost aggressively. They
continuously search for breaches in tort or contract that will make
a collective suit opportune, interview potential class action
representatives somewhat affected by the breaches, and file the
lawsuit as quickly as possible.
These entrepreneurial lawyers have also changed the way they
interact with clients in both collective and unitary litigation.
Lawyers now broach settlement very early on in the litigation.
They also consider alternative dispute resolution favourably. One
reason for this culture shift is, possibly, the emphasis in Canadian
153. Mauro Cappelletti, The Law-Making Power of the Judge and Its
Limits: A Comparative Analysis, 8 MONASH U. L. REV. 15, 36 (1981).
154. Id. at 36-37.
155. This change in attitude has been the subject of many articles about the
“entrepreneurialism” of class action lawyers. See, e.g., Coffee, The Regulation
of Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 50.
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law schools on alternative dispute resolution and on informal
judicial outcomes (such as settlement) in civil litigation.156
Another reason for the cultural shift is the obvious potential for an
earlier payment in attorney fees.
C. One Example of the Class Action Influence on Culture: The
Residential Schools Settlement
I have argued above that class actions serve to influence or
affect Canadian culture. The recent Indian Residential Schools
national class action and settlement serve to illustrate this
argument.157 In this national class action, former students of
recognized residential schools in Canada and their family members
sued the Government of Canada and various church-related entities
for harms and abuses that were committed against Aboriginal
children. The Indian residential schools at stake were schools
supervised by the Federal Government, under policies that resulted
in the removal of Aboriginal children from their families and
communities, their assimilation through practices designed to
extinguish their Aboriginal character, and upon graduation, their
integration into a non-Aboriginal society. In 2006, a Canada-wide
settlement agreement was concluded regarding this class action,
seeking to address the mental, spiritual, and physical harm done to
the former students as a result of the practices of the residential
schools.
This national class action and its settlement were deeply
influenced by culture. Indeed, the Aboriginal students and their
families–identified as the “Survivor Class,” estimated to number
almost 79,000 persons–shared commonly held values, ideas, and
norms that they brought forward by advancing class action claims.
The settlement the students concluded considered the lasting and
profound cultural effects of the residential schools legacy, and
sought to bring closure and compensate the harm suffered by the
Aboriginal community at large.
156. See, e.g., the undergraduate law curriculum offered at McGill
University,
available
at
http://www.mcgill.ca/files/lawstudies/Course_offerings_2008-2009.pdf (last visited September 26, 2009).
157. For information about this class action and the various provincial and
territorial approval orders regarding the national settlement, see Residential
Schools Settlement, available at http://www.residentialschoolsettlement.ca/
(last visited September 26, 2009).
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The class action and its settlement also sought to influence and
probably influenced Canadian culture. Part of the settlement
provided for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, with a mandate to make a public and permanent
record of the legacy of the schools, in conjunction with taking a
significant portion of the settlement fund for healing and
commemoration programs. It led to a public apology to the
Aboriginal people by Prime Minister Harper on June 11, 2008.158
Hence, although there is no proven evidence yet of the effect of
this settlement on Canadian citizens, the gigantic scope and
specific, culturally-founded conditions of this national settlement
most certainly affected–and will likely continue to affect–the ideas,
beliefs, values, and norms of these citizens.
VI. THE METHODOLOGY TO STUDY CLASS ACTION LAW
Civil procedure is an extraordinarily fertile terrain for the
cultural analysis of law and to learn about law’s place in culture.
The analysis of class action objectives, effects, and trends affords a
clearer understanding of legal culture, and vice versa. But how can
we best analyze these objectives, effects, and trends to ultimately
support suggestions for reform in class action law? What is the
most efficacious methodology to obtain trustworthy data about the
resolution of class action disputes by trial and/or settlement?
In this paper, I have argued that class actions are procedural
vehicles of great importance to our society.
They affect
individuals, businesses, and society at large.
They affect
developments in the substantive law, and in politics, and the
economy. Hence, finding the best methodology to study them is
crucial, especially in a context where procedural reform is
envisaged. Indeed, since the legal system’s effectiveness is in
great part dependant on citizens’ abidance to law and on their
acceptance of the rules, efforts must be made to make this system
coincide with contemporary social values and needs–and with
modern legal culture.
Legal theory, mostly in the form of doctrine, must be given
significant weight in civil procedure reform. Quantitative studies
158. See, e.g., public apology by Prime Minister Harper (June 11, 2008),
available
at
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/06/11/aboriginalapology.html (last visited September 26, 2009).
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based on the judicial outcomes of reported court cases and
statistics based on these outcomes are also useful. There are,
however, many issues in civil procedure that can be more
adequately addressed, discussed and eventually resolved with the
use of empirical research.159 For instance, one way to assess
whether the deterrence objective is met in a class proceeding is by
empirically testing whether the defendant’s behaviour has changed
since the lawsuit was filed. Has the defendant changed its internal
environmental policies, to prevent further toxic waste, for
example? In addition, the effectiveness of the class action–
notably, as a means of getting long-term benefits for particular
groups160–can be evaluated with the use of empirical research.
This type of research could, for instance, look into whether
workers are, in fact, treated more fairly and equally by their
company in the years following judgment in an employment
discrimination class action case.
One example of a study that brilliantly integrated both
theoretical and empirical approaches to civil procedure in the class
action law context is Bryant Garth’s analysis of concluded federal
class actions from the Northern District of California.161 In it,
Garth sought to assess critically the “‘social change’ impact of the
class action.”162 Using case studies and interviews with class
counsel and representatives, Garth organized the class actions he
examined in three categories: Category A - Organizational efforts
159. Bryant G. Garth, Introduction: Toward a Sociology of the Class
Action, 57 IND. L. J. 371, 371-72 (1982) (noting that qualitative research “needs
to be supplemented by more ‘qualitative’ empirical studies that can ‘open . . . to
public view the back regions and activities of processing institutions’.”).
160. Id. at 380.
161. Garth, supra note 54. For further examples of empirical studies of
class action litigation, see, e.g., James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the NewIssues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 903 (1996) (where the authors reviewed a sample of initial public offerings
that generated class action litigation); Willging et al., supra note 133; Janet C.
Alexander, supra note 130 (where the author studied the size of settlements in
computer and computer-related securities class actions relative to the strength of
the case); Bryant G. Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General:
Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 353 (1987) (where the authors address the ideological concept of “private
attorney general,” using a combination of theory with empirical grounding and
data to explore and highlight ideological assumptions and concerns.).
162. Garth, supra note 54, at 238.

2009]

CLASS ACTION LAW

143

with incidental clientele (including cases about overpayments of
unemployment
compensation
and
disability
payment
terminations); Category B - Entrepreneurial lawyer with passive
client (including cases about retail price fixing and price fixing to
distributors); and Category C - Energetic and active plaintiffs
(including Hispanic complaints against an employment test,
employment discrimination against Blacks in retail sales, sex
discrimination in employment promotions, etc.). He concluded
that the class action is a “politically empowered legal artifice” and
that empirical research is relevant to the study of class action
litigation because it examines,
the impacts of the full range of empowering and
nonempowering features of class action litigation . . .
investigates particular revelations from discovery, the
denial or granting of various motions in the case, the
judges’ seeming attitude toward settlement or the merits,
the shifting of legal theory or class representatives, or
simply the effect of delay and inactivity; and it
[investigates] how ground-level events affect the lawsuit.163
In another interesting empirical study about class actions, New
York University Professor Geoffrey P. Miller examined the
veracity of the cultural stereotype that class actions are more
popular in the Gulf States of Texas and Louisiana; that these two
states are “favorite havens for plaintiffs’ attorneys and purgatory
for the defense.”164 In his study, Miller wondered whether this
description is true, whether there is indeed something different
about class action practice in these two states, and if there are
differences, what explains them. The empirical evidence Miller
reviewed derived from research conducted in various Westlaw
databases, which essentially inquired as to the frequency of the
term “class action” in the applicable data set.165 Before factoring
in elements such as demographics, economic activity, and income
163. Id. at 269.
164. Geoffrey P. Miller, Class Actions in the Gulf States: Empirical
Analysis of a Cultural Stereotype, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1681 (2000). For a
discussion of the class actions that were recently been started in Louisiana after
Hurricane Katrina, see Olivier Moréteau, Policing the Compensation of Victims
of Catastrophes: Combining Solidarity and Self-Responsibility, 54 LOY. L. REV.
65 (2008).
165. Miller, supra note 164, at 1688.
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levels, Miller found that the class action explosion in the Gulf
States could be explained by the data reviewed.166 But when the
three factors were taken into consideration, his conclusion was
more mitigated. He found that:
. . . when we control for population, a radical split occurs.
Louisiana’s rate per capita is far above the national
average, while Texas’s rate, even in recent years of
increased class action litigation, is still below the national
rate. This result remains robust when we control for
personal income; indeed, the position of Louisiana relative
to other states becomes even more anomalous. Something
very different is obviously occurring in these two states.167
Interestingly, while Miller did not provide reasons for the
patterns observed in Louisiana and Texas, his empirical analysis
does not just explain developments in class action practice in these
two states, but it serves to reinforce the link I have advocated
herein between class action law and culture. Indeed, Miller’s study
supports the cultural stereotype that Louisiana is a class action
“haven.” Furthermore, his study is informed by the two-pronged
research methodology I have supported, which contains both
theoretical and empirical data.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have argued that law is inherent to culture and
culture to law. I have extended this argument to the civil
procedure and class action context. My cultural construction of
class action law has embraced two ideas: that the North American
class action is a mirror of North American culture–in light of three
of its principal characteristics of access to justice, managerial
judging, and a preference for settlements–and that the class action
influences culture–as evidenced by changes in the legal institutions
and legal profession. Finally, I have argued in favour of a twopronged analysis of class action law, which includes theoretical
and empirical components.

166. Id. at 1699.
167. Id. at 1706.
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Going back to the Hocking case,168 discussed in this paper’s
introduction, serves to once again, reinforce my principal argument
that law and culture reciprocally influence each other. Indeed, in
this case, the Quebec Court of Appeal was able to reaffirm a
stricter standard of notice in class action law, and hence influence
perceptions, opinions, ideas, and legal norms relative to class
action law notice practices in Quebec and Ontario, and perhaps
even throughout the country.
Legal academics have suggested that legal systems are
increasingly characterized by a certain apparent convergence that
makes them evolve in parallel directions.169 In my view, these
systems are also culturally constructed and thus distinguishable
based on their specific legal cultures. Are these two arguments
reconcilable? In the class action law context, there is a certain
amount of convergence between systems, as previously discussed.
But the convergence is limited by the particular legal system’s
cultural specificities. For instance, Europeans are still reluctant to
make class proceedings widely acceptable, in part because their
notions of the role of law and the client are fundamentally
inconsistent with North American class action culture.170
In conclusion, class action law systems will likely continue
evolving at a steady pace. They will also remain deeply influenced
by and attached to legal culture. In that way, they are like fastgrowing grain crops that must be planted, cultivated, and fertilized
consistently with specific agricultural customs and traditions, for
the most fruitful harvest.

168. Hocking, supra note 1.
169. Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation
Come to Europe?, Social Science Research Network, NYU Law and Economics
Research
Paper
No.
08-46,
3
(2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1296843
(last
visited
September 26, 2009); Friedman, supra note 28, at 72.
170. See Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for
Continental Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 217,
289-290 (1992). See also, Linda Silberman, The Vicissitudes of the American
Class Action–With a Comparative Eye, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 201 (1999);
Burbank & Silberman, supra note 109.

